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Abstract. The rich revenue gained from a mobile application
(a.k.a. app) boost app owners (sellers) to manipulate the app store
with fake ratings. One effective way to hire fake rating providers is
bribery. The fake ratings given by the bribed buyers influence the
evaluation of the app, which further have an impact on the decision-
making of potential buyers. In this paper, we study bribery in a rat-
ing system with multiple sellers and buyers, which extends the sin-
gle seller situation discussed in [5]. We analyze the effect of bribing
strategy using game theory methodology and examine the existence
of its an equilibrium state, in which the rating system is expected
to be bribery-proof: no bribery strategy yields a strictly positive ex-
pected gain to the seller. Our study first concentrates on the analysis
of the static game with a fixed number of sellers and buyers, then
we model a real-world setting towards a dynamic game. On top of
our analysis, we conclude that at least one Nash equilibrium can be
reached in the bribery game of the rating system.
1 Introduction
In e-marketplaces (e.g. app store), buyers select reputable items (e.g.
apps) offered by sellers based on their direct experiences and rat-
ings from other buyers. However, it is infeasible for a buyer to in-
teract with all sellers in order to gain the direct experience. As a
result, trust/reputation system evaluated on ratings or reviews, act as
a crucial tool to support buyers’ decision-making [8]. Various studies
have demonstrated that high profit is attached with high reputation.
A study of eBay conducted by Resnick et al. revealed that buyers
were willing to pay 8% more to the item offered by reputable sellers
than that provided by new sellers [12]. Ye et al. [18] in their study
showed that a 10% improvement in reviewers rating can increase the
number of bookings in a hotel by 4.4%. Driven by profit, sellers have
incentives to perform unfair rating attacks by bribing buyers and in-
crease their aggregated evaluation above their competitors as this in-
creases market share and overall revenues. Fake ratings have been
reported on a real world movie dataset collected by Cao et al. [1],
the fake ratings dominate the rating distribution in the first few days
as soon as the movie is released. The fake ratings are mainly divided
into two categories, fake positive ratings to boost the reputation of
the sellers owner and dishonest negative ratings to decrease the rep-
utation of their competitors. The appearance of underground market
specially for bribery in providing fake ratings make the problem even
worse [13].
Two potential reasons attract the sellers to bribe “bot farms” or
“human water armies” [16] to inflate the App downloads, ratings and
reviews. The first is the rating or review sparsity. From our analysis
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on Google Play app store, the rating ratio is as low as 2.1% based
on our crawled top more than 20,000 apps [19]. That is, about 2 out
of 100 buyers or users of the app rate their ratings or reviews on
the platform. In such situation, app owners can easily increase the
positive evaluation of their app by bribing buyers with a compensa-
tion, monetary or not. That is, sellers exchange for positive ratings
by bribing a group of buyers with certain payment. The positive rat-
ings further influence the sellers’ future revenues. The second reason
is the attractive revenue gained from temporal (usually in a daily ba-
sis) top app ranking. App developers resort to fraudulent means to
deliberately boost up their app ranking on an App store [20]. In this
paper, we analyze the effect of bribing strategy by defining the util-
ity function as well as strategy space for each seller. On top of that,
we model the problem as economic game and examine whether an
equilibrium state is existed, in which the rating system is expected
to be bribery-proof: no individual seller want to perform any bribery
strategy.
In single-player decision theory the key notion is that of an opti-
mal strategy, that is, a strategy that maximizes the players expected
payoff for a given environment in which the player operates such as
discussed in [9, 5]. Such a situation in the single-player case can be
fraught with uncertainty, since the environment might be stochastic,
partially observable, and spring all kinds of surprises on the player.
In our work, we consider the case with a multi-player setting. In
which the environment consists of other players, all of whom are
also willing to maximize their payoffs. As a result, the notion of an
optimal strategy for a given players is not meaningful as the best
strategy also depends on the choices of others. The equilibrium state
is reached when all players perform their best strategy considering
others players’ strategies. We argue the multi-player setting is even
more complex and challenging than that with a single-agent setting.
In the multi-player setting, we model the sellers as players, and map
the bribing behavior into strategy space in game theory. Based on the
model, we intend to find the equilibrium state within all combina-
tions of sellers’ strategies. To simplify our analysis, we will be using
the terms “seller”, “player” or “app owner” interchangeably.
In detail, we first consider the static game, in which the number of
sellers and buyers are fixed in a time slot. We show the strategy space
is exponential increase with the number of sellers and buyers. To find
the equilibrium state in the static game, we devise a greedy algorithm
to eliminate the dominated strategies. As the rating system in real-
world is indeed a dynamic game, that is, the buyers in the market is
dynamic in and out, their payoff is dynamically changed with time.
We extend our findings in static game to games in which the payoffs
are dynamically changed with time, or are dependent on the strategy
profiles of the players. While games in which the payoffs are constant
have received much attention, games with dynamic payoffs have not
been studied extensively in literature. We show in this paper that how
such games can model bribery in rating system closely.
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(a) Scatter plot of 1609 apps from Apple app store
on their averaged rating and the number of reviews
received in the following month.
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Averaged rating before April, 2019
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
# 
of
 re
vi
ew
s i
n 
th
e 
fo
llo
wi
ng
 7
 m
on
th
s
1e4
All genres (16422 Apps)
Business (621 Apps)
Game (4263 Apps)
(b) Lineplot of apps with different genres in
Google Play on their averaged rating and the num-
ber of reviews received in the following 7 months.
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
# of reviews
102
104
106
108
# 
of
 in
st
al
ls
(c) Scatter plot of 16422 apps from Google Play
on their received reviews and installs in 7 months.
Both x− and y− axes are in log scale.
Figure 1. Snowball effect shown on apps in different app stores and with different genres. Data of Apple app store is collected from December, 2016 to May,
2017, while data of Google Play is collected from April, 2019 to November, 2019.
Our contributions:
• We extend the bribery problem in rating system to multiple sell-
ers and buyers situation, and explicit interpret the problem from a
game theory perspective.
• On top of the model, we analyze the effect of bribing strategies in
case of static and dynamic games. In static game, we found Nash
equilibrium exists in sellers’ strategy space and too many buyers
are bribed under Nash equilibrium compared to the social opti-
mum. In dynamic game where the payoff is uncertain, we trans-
form it into complete but imperfect game and analyze the best
response for sellers based on their own beliefs.
• Based on our analysis, we further quantify the effect of fair ratings.
That is, to what extent fair ratings from normal users can resist to
bribery in rating system.
We model the relation between rating and its corresponding profit
(evaluated in the number of installs) in Section 2. In Section 3, we
formally define the game settings and focus on analyzing the bribing
strategies in static game. Section 4 extends the game into dynamic
setting, where the payoffs of the player is uncertain. We discuss the
effect of fair ratings as well as how to estimate the current bribery
level of a system in Section 5. The paper is rounded off with conclu-
sion on our mail findings in Section 6.
2 Profit Modeling and Related Work
We collect real-world data to show how our problem can be repre-
sented as economic game. By crawling the statistical data (rating,
reviews) of 1609 apps from Apple App Store during December 2016
to May 2017 and the data of rating, app genre, reviews, installs on
16422 apps from Google Play, we first model the relation between
rating and its potential profit in the number of installs. Although in-
dividual apps may exhibit different patterns between rating and their
installs, we study whether the overall pattern is consistent between
apps from different app stores or app genres. We found higher-rated
apps get more reviews (ratings) even they are in different app sotre-
sor within different app genres, as shown in Figure 1 (a) and (b). We
note the relation between the rating r and the number reviews Nrev
received based on the ratings follows a power function:
Nrev = a · rn (1)
where a 6= 0. As not all buyers score their rating after purchase,
our rating data cannot accurately capture the relation between rating
and the transaction volume. We further show the scatter plot of the
number of reviews and installs on apps in Figure 1 (c). We examine
two reasons that can potentially explain the extent to which a direct
plot on ratings and installs of apps is not a plausible attempt. The
first is that the number of installs is highly skewed. The second is
the number of installs in Google Play is an estimate on the order of
magnitude of downloads. From Figure 1 (c), we can see the log scale
of the number of installs Nins is proportional to the log scale of the
number of reviews Nrev . That is:
logNins = b · logNrev ⇔ Nins = (Nrev)b (2)
where a 6= 0. Substituting Equation (1) into Equation (2), we have:
Nins = Ω1 · rΩ2 (3)
where Ω1 = ab and Ω2 = n · b. The number of installs based on rat-
ings also shows a snowball effect, when a few buyers explore a good
app, everyone else wants to pile it on. On top of the observation, app
owners competed to increase their app evaluation in order to increase
their purchase revenue. For a single seller, with limited number of
buyers, maximizing its own payoff will influence one another’s wel-
fare. To this end, the problem can be represented as economic game.
To present our model, we assume in the rating system, each seller
can observe the current buyers of other sellers’, as well as the current
evaluation from the buyers. The common knowledge in our game:
a). The players are rational, meaning they hoping to maximize their
payoffs. b). In static game, all the players know their own payoffs as
well as others, but also that all the players know that all the players
know all the players’ payoffs, and that all the players know that all
the players know that all the players know all the players’ payoffs,
and so on, ad infinitum. We first let the number of buyers be constant
in static game, the bribery space for a seller is the buyers that have
not interacted with that seller. We relax the restriction in dynamic
game, in which new buyers are considered in the strategy space.
In deed, our study can be applied to all rating-based systems in
which individuals influence the decision of one other in the opinion
they give and bribery can disrupt buyers to interact with fake rep-
utable sellers.
Related research lines: Our approach relates to several research
lines in computational social choice, game theory and reputation sys-
tems.
Computational social choice In our studied rating system, sellers
trying to influence potential buyers’ decisions to maximize their
own expected payoff. The problem is analogous to lobbying and
bribery in computational social choice, where agents manipulate
or modify their outcomes to reach their objectives [2, 3]. Lobby-
ing and bribery are established concepts in computational social
choice, the research range from the seminal contribution of [6] to
recent studies such as vote buying in [11].
Reputation systems Dishonest ratings influence the accuracy of
reputation evaluation, hence, a robust reputation system should
detect the attacks and mitigate the influence caused by the at-
tacks [17]. Otherwise, the disruptive reputation can influence other
agents. In this sense, ours can be seen as a study of reputation in
Multi-agent systems [7]. To analyse the harm of unfair ratings,
more recent studies based on information theory are proposed in
papers [14] and [15].
3 Static Game
Consider within a time slot, M sellers denote as S and N buyers
denote as B in the app store. Each seller has their app (one-to-one
mapping) released on the app store, the app is evaluated by a finite set
of buyers Bi = {b1, b2, ..., bl}, l <= N . In our context, we focus
our analysis on homogeneous apps. low rated app owner intend to
bribe a set of buyers to increase its app evaluation. We assume one
buyer can only bribed by one seller. The scored rating is proportional
to the payment. For fair rater, based on his experience, he submits
a rating to evaluate the app. All the ratings r are drawn from a set
of values r ∈ [0, 1]. Although discrete assignment of 1 to 5 stars
are common in online rating systems, such as Amazon, Apple store
and Google play etc., the stars can be mapped onto [0, 1] interval to
simplify the analysis.
We study the rating systems such as used in Apple store, every in-
terested buyers can see the evaluation of other buyers. Buyer paid for
the app can evaluate it, and the aggregation of the evaluation will in-
fluence potential buyers’ decision. We represent the aggregated eval-
uation on the app of seller i as a function on the associated ratings
Ri = {r1, r2, ..., rk}, k ≤ l (not all buyers score their evaluation)
received: V al(Ri) = avg(Ri), where avg is the average function
across all real-valued ratings. For short, we denote r¯i = avg(Ri).
Suppose in a time slot (e.g. app is released or updated in the mar-
ket), all the sellers perform bribery strategy to increase their app eval-
uation and therefore the profit based on their current rating distribu-
tion. We define the strategy of sellers in the form of an ensemble of
individual strategies:
Definition 1. An individual strategy on buyer b is the amount of
effort φ(b) required to improve its current rating to a new rating.
We denote: φ(b) → [0,+∞). A strategy of a seller is an en-
semble of individual strategies on each buyer b ∈ Bφ, such that∑
b∈Bφ φ(b) ∈ [0,+∞].
Under bribery, buyer’s evaluation is closed undermin1, x+ y for
all x, y ∈ [0, 1]. To compare with the results of [5], we adopt that
the bribed cost is proportional to buyer’s rating. For example, buyer
bj’s evaluation is 0.5, when it bribed by seller i with φ(bj) = 0.6,
the new evaluation will be min{1, x + y} = min{1, 1.1} = 1. By
definition 1, the total cost for seller i to perform a bribery on a set of
buyers Bφ is
∑
b∈Bφ φ(b).
Next, we define the potential utility to seller i can be gained from
bribing a set of buyers. Theoretically, a seller can bribe all the avail-
able buyers in the market, however, the potential value will approach
zero because of no future interaction. Since few bribed sellers have
substantial profit to obtain, adding one more may do little harm to
those already bribed sellers, but when so many sellers are bribing that
they are all just barely having no profit or losing their bribery pay-
ment. In this section, to simplify our analysis, we assume the utility
that a seller gets is proportionality to its aggregated rating. That is,
we let Ω2 = 1 in Equation (3). The assumption does not influence
our final conclusion.
Definition 2. The expected utility of a seller i is a function:
u(r¯i) = N · r¯iΩ2 · k, (4)
whereN = N −∑Mi |Bi| is the potential buyers in the market, k is
the profit from an app purchase.
The utility of a seller i amounts to the number of potential buyers
in the markets and the rating rated by the interacted buyers. The in-
tuition behind is that buyers favor to download and use higher rated
apps. Based on previous definitions, we can define the payoff of a
bribery strategy.
Definition 3. Let φ be a strategy and Bφ is the bribed buyers by φ.
The payoff to seller i from φ is:
pi(φ) = uφ − u0 −
∑
b∈Bφ
φ(b),
where u0 is the initial utility and uφ is the utility after execution of
φ.
Definition 4. Let φ′ and φ′′ be feasible strategies for seller i. Strat-
egy φ′ is strictly dominated by φ′′ if for each feasible combination of
the other players’ strategies, i’s payoff from playing φ′ is less than
i’s payoff from playing φ′′:
pi(φ1, ..., φi−1, φ
′, φi+1, ..., φn) <
pi(φ1, ..., φi−1, φ
′′, φi+1, ..., φn)
for each (φ1, ..., φi−1, φi+1, ..., φn) that can be constructed from
the other players’ strategy spaces Φ1, Φi−1, Φi+1, ..., Φn. Let φ−i
denote the strategy combination from players other than i. Then, if
occasionally, pi(φ′, φ−i) = pi(φ′′, φ−i), we denote φ′ is weakly dom-
inated by φ′′.
Given the definition and the conclusion in paper [5], a rational
seller would prefer greedy strategy to others under same budget. In
other words, strategy that bribing non-raters is always dominated. Let
Algorithm 1 define the greedy bribing strategy.
Proposition 5. Under same combination strategies φ−i of other sell-
ers’, the greedy bribing strategy φo for seller i is always dominates
others with same budget B.
Proof. Let φ be any strategy. The payoff for seller i:
pi(φ) = uφ − u0 − B
We omit φ−i when clear from the context.
Let Bφ and Bφo be the bribed buyers under strategy φ and φo
respectively.
pi(φo)− pi(φ) =
uφ
o − u0 − B − (uφ − u0 − B) =
uφ
o − uφ =
k · [(N − |Bφo |)B +R|Bφo | − (N − |Bφ|)
B +R
|Bφ| ]
Algorithm 1: The greedy bribing strategy
Input: Seller i’s evaluation set Bi, Ri, budget B ;
Output: A bribing strategy φ;
Function greedy (Bi, Ri,B)
Sort rj ∈ Ri in ascending order RD = r0, ..., rl;
foreach rj in RD do
if B > 0 then
if rj < 1 then
φ(j) = min{1− rj ,B};
B = B − φ(j)
end
end
end
if B > 0 then
Compute non-rater set B−i;
foreach j in B−i do
if B > 0 then
φ(j) = min{1, G};
B = B − φ(j)
end
end
end
end
where R =
∑o
i∈Ri ri is the sum of received ratings before applying
the strategy.
According to Algorithm 1, we can infer |Bφ| ≥ |Bφo |. Therefore,
we have:
N − |Bφo | ≥ N − |Bφ|
B +R
|Bφo | ≥
B +R
|Bφ|
⇒ pi(φo)− pi(φ) ≥ 0
Under same budget, it shows when bribes a buyer, it is worthy to
bribe it completely to the highest rating.
We further analyze under what conditions the rating system is
bribery-proof. Based on the above proposition, we are able to show
that no strategy is profitable if the number of potential buyers is too
low, i.e., the ratio between number of current rated buyers |Bi| and
potential buyers greater than the profit of an item k.
Lemma 6. For seller i, no strategy is profitable if:
|Bi|
N ≥ k
Proof. Let φ be any strategy for seller i and i’s current rated buyers
Bi 6= ∅ . Then by definition 3, the payoff under φwith bribing budget
B > 0 is:
pi(φ) = uφ − u0 − B
According to proposition 5, greedy strategy dominates others. We
give proof for greedy strategy here.
pi(φ) =
uφ − u0 − B =
N B +
∑
i∈Ri ri
|Bi| · k −N
∑
i∈Ri ri
|Bi| · k − B =
N · k · ( B|Bi| )− B
If strategy φ is profitable, then:
N · k · ( B|Bi| )− B > 0
Therefore, for profitable strategy, we have:
|Bi|
N < k
From this it follows that for seller that have already bribed large
number of buyers, further bribing may result in no profit.
In real world, a bad reputed seller is more desired to improved its
aggregated evaluation by performing bribery strategy. In multi-player
situation, an open question for seller i is whether a best response to
other player’s strategies is existed. In next section, we analyse the
strategy space for each player and identify the best response in multi-
player situation.
3.1 Best Response
In previous section, we show that bribery more buyers may not result
in more profit. When bribes one buyer, it is better to induce them to
give highest rating. Because greedy strategy always dominates other
strategies. However, in real word, a buyer who have given their rating
may not willing to improve it. Thus, in this section, we redefine the
game in this situation. Seller i’s current status is its aggregated ratings
r¯i amounts to the number of potential buyers in the market. For low
V al(Ri), sellers will try to bribe new buyers to give rating 1. We
define the strategy of a seller: a strategy φ for seller i is the number
of buyers will be bribed φi. The strategy space [0,+∞) covers all
the choices that could be of interest to seller i.
Based on Lemma 6, there is a maximum number of buyers that can
be bribed by seller i in the market. For seller i, it is always profitable
to bribe the interacted buyers if Lemma 6 holds. On the contrary,
if interacted buyers can not improve their given rating, we are curi-
ous about how many buyers should be bribed for a seller to result in
maximized profit.
The payoff to seller i from bribing φi buyers when the numbers of
buyers bribed by the other sellers are (φ1, ..., φi−1, φi+1, ..., φn) is:
pi(φi, φ−i) = u
(φi,φ−i) − u0 − φi (5)
where u(φi,φ−i) is utility for seller i after i’s execution of φi and the
others execution of φ−i respectively.
Theorem 7. The bribery game G in rating system has at least one
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. From Nash theorem [10], every game with a finite number
of players and action profiles has at least one Nash equilibrium. In
a bribery game, both the number of sellers and the strategy space is
finite. Therefore, at least one Nash equilibrium can be reached in the
game.
If (φ∗1, ..., φ∗n) is to be a Nash equilibrium, then, for each
i, φ∗i must maximize 6 given that the other sellers choose
(φ∗1, ..., φ
∗
i−1, φ
∗
i+1, ..., φ
∗
n). The first-order condition for this opti-
mization problem is:
∂pi(φi, φ−i)
∂φi
=
∂u(φi,φ−i)
∂φi
− 1 = 0
That is:
∂u(φi,φ−i)
∂φi
= 1 (6)
Based on Lamma 6, for seller i, if |Bi|N ≥ k, the optimal strategy
for i would be φi = 0. The best response (φ∗1, ..., φ∗n) will solve:
∂u(φ1,φ−1)
∂φ1
= 1
... = 1
∂u(φn,φ−n)
∂φn
= 1
(7)
Subject to:
φi ∈ N∑
i∈S
φi <= N
φi = 0; if
|Bi|
N ≥ k
(8)
Example 1. Consider two sellers of duopoly game in a market.
Each seller i with interacted buyers’ Bi = 5 and j with Bj = 2 re-
spectively. Those buyers can not bribe again by other bribery strate-
gies. The average evaluation given by those buyers on i and j are
r¯i = 0.2 and r¯j = 0.5 respectively. The total number of buyers in
the market is n = 20. The profit for bribing one buyer is k = 2. The
strategy for the sellers is φi and φj . If (φi, φj) is to be a Nash equi-
librium, according to the above statements, strategies should solve 6.
Substituting φi in equation 6 and expanding uφi yields:
k · [(N −
∑
i∈S
φi)
r¯i · |Bi|+ φi
|Bi|+ φi ]
′ = 1 (9)
where M0 is the number of interacted buyers in the market before
performing the bribery. Each φi can be solved by computing all the
sellers’ first-order conditions under constraints 8. Solving the partial
differential equations under the constraints yields: φi = 2, φj = 1.
In this example, the first 4 strategies for both seller dominant oth-
ers, we further present the bribery problem in the accompanying bi-
matrix 1.
Table 1. Bribery model of duopoly
j
0 1 2 3
i
0 5.20, 13.00 4.80, 15.00 4.40, 14.50 4.00, 13.00
1 7.00, 12.00 6.33, 13.67 5.67, 13.00 5.00, 11.40
2 7.43, 11.00 6.57, 12.33 5.71, 11.50 4.86, 9.80
3 7.00, 10.00 6.00, 11.00 5.00, 10.00 4.00, 8.20
The above result can also be derived by iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies. In Table 1, both seller i and j has four
strategies. For seller j, strategy 1 strictly dominates the others, so a
rational seller j will play strategies 1 anyway. Thus, if seller i knows
that seller j is rational then seller i can eliminate strategies 0, 2 and 3
from seller i strategy space. In the second column, seller i’s strategy
2 strictly dominates the others, leaving (6.57, 12.33) as the outcome
of the game.
We also plot seller i’s payoff in Figure 2. In the figure, when the
strategy is larger than 4, the payoff is decreased linearly. This is con-
sistent with Lemma 6 that bribed more buyers may not have more
profit.
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Figure 2. Seller i’s payoff in a bribery game.
In contrast to individual maximized payoff, the social optimum
O∗∗ =∑ni=1 φ∗∗i , solves:
max
0≤O∗∗<∞
h(O∗∗) = max
0≤φ∗∗i ≤n
m∑
i=1
pi(φ∗∗i , φ−i) (10)
Let h(O) =
∑m
i=1 pi(φi, φ−i), where O =
∑m
i=1. As a conse-
quence of Theorem 7 we obtain:
Corollary 8. Too many buyers are bribed in the Nash equilibrium,
compared to the social optimum. That is: O∗ ≥ O∗∗.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that O∗ < O∗∗. Then there must
exist at least one seller i′ indexed i′, 1 ≤ i′ ≤ m, that φ∗∗i′ > φ∗i′ ,
since
∑m
i=1 φ
∗∗
i = O
∗∗ > O∗ =
∑m
i=1 φ
∗
i . Because φ
∗
i′ is the
number of bribed buyers for seller i′ that can maximize pi(φi′ , φ−i′).
By definition, pi(φ∗i′ , φ−i′) > pi(φ
∗∗
i′ , φ−i′). Then, to maximize the
social welfare, we have:
i′∑
i=1
pi(φi, φ−i) + pi(φ
∗
i′ , φ−i′) +
m∑
i=i′
pi(φi, φ−i) >
i′∑
i=1
pi(φi, φ−i) + pi(φ
∗∗
i′ , φ−i′) +
m∑
i=i′
pi(φi, φ−i)
which means there exist anotherO′ =
∑i′
i=1 φ
∗
i +φi′+
∑m
i=i′ φ
∗
i <
O∗∗, that have h(O′) > h(O∗∗). Thus contradicted with our as-
sumption that O∗∗ is the social optimum.
The corollary illustrates the problem of commons [4], where the
common resource is overutilized because each seller considers only
his or her own incentives, not the effect of his or her actions on the
other sellers. In general, cooperative behavior is more desirable for
the general good, but competitive behavior may bring higher individ-
ual gain.
4 Game under Uncertainty
The number of buyers is dynamic changed with time in a real-world
setting. In this section, we analyze the game under uncertain, dy-
namic situation. As the number of buyers fluctuates with time, we
define games with dynamic payoffs, and how these games are dif-
ferent from the usual games. Then, we describe the bribery game in
dynamic number of buyers. Finally, we present the model employed
and the results obtained from the analysis.
The game forms discussed so far assumed that all sellers know
what game is being played. Specifically, the number of sellers, the
number of potential buyers, the actions available to each seller, and
the payoff associated with each action vector, have all been assumed
to be common knowledge among the seller. We say the game have
complete information if everyone knows everyones payoff function,
and everyone knows everyone knows this, and so on ad infinitum.
In contrast, incomplete information means that players are not sure
what the other players in the game are like, as defined by their payoff
functions, or what they know about other players. In real world situ-
ation, such as the bribery problem discussed here, player do not have
complete information about everyone they interact with. This lack
of common knowledge can greatly add to the complexity of a game,
and the possible strategies that players might adopt. One immediate
problem of solving games with incomplete information is that the
techniques so far discussed cannot be directly applied to these sit-
uations. This is because they all make the fundamental assumption
that players know which game they are playing. This is not the case
if players are unsure what their opponents are like. The beliefs of
the different sellers on the number of potential buyers result in dif-
ferent action of each seller. For example, given a player with a high
percentage of low ratings and its positive belief about the number of
potential buyers, he would prefer a more aggressive bribery action
against other players. However, it turns out that these other types of
uncertainty can be reduced to uncertainty only about payoffs. In our
payoff definition 3, the uncertainty of potential buyers directly lead
to the uncertainty of payoff.
Let us reconsider a variant of the game studied in previous section,
in which each player i knows his own belief on the number of poten-
tial buyers but is uncertain of the other players beliefs. The belief of
the seller is represented by the probability distribution on his strat-
egy space. Given a seller’s belief, the expected payoff from playing
strategy φi is pi(φi)p(φi|λ(t)), where λ(t) dynamic rate of potential
buyers following the Poisson distribution at time t.
We describe the sequence of the game as follows:
1. Seller 1 chooses a strategy φ1 from the feasible strategy set based
on his beliefs.
2. Seller i chooses a strategy φi from the feasible strategy set based
on his beliefs.
3. Payoffs are pii(φi)p(φi|λ(t)) for each seller i.
However, in one stage, sellers also can choose to perform strategy
without bribing any buyers. The strategy from later seller may con-
dition their actions upon the actions of at least of one other seller in
the game. As previously stated, sellers are uncertain about other sell-
ers’ strategies. The seller knows its own beliefs about the number of
potential buyers.
If we assume the number of potential buyers as static, from The-
ory 7, the sellers’ strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. However,
in dynamic context, no seller knows the number of potential buyers
n. This uncertainty is expressed as the possibility distribution on n.
Given n, the optimal strategy can be referred by Lemma 6. Under
dynamic situation, the expected payoff for seller i is defined as:
Ei(φ≺k) =
∑
φij∈Φi
(
∏
k∈S
p(φkj |φ≺k))pi(φij , φ−ij)
where φ≺k is the strategies chose by the sellers before seller k.
p(φkj|φ≺k) denotes the probability to choose strategy kj for seller
k after observing other sellers’ strategies φ≺k.
The best response for seller i is try to solve:
arg max
φij∈Φi
Ei(φ≺k)
The equilibrium concept used here is Bayesian Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium. Each seller has no incentive to deviate from its
best response.
5 Discussion
By discussion, we show how fair ratings act as an important role in
resisting bribery. Although according to proposition 5, greedy strat-
egy dominates others, but in fair rating situation, the scored rating
by those fair raters can not be bribed. We analyse the effect of fair
ratings under following settings.
To clear our analysis, we denote the number of fair ratings for
seller i asNFi , the aggregated rating value of fair raters as rFi . Then
the current aggregate evaluation of i is |Bi|+ rFi .
We quantify the effect of fair ratings by analyzing the utility of
seller. Initially, the utility for seller i is: u0 = NB · k. When a group
of honest buyer score a set of fair ratings, the utility will be: uf =
(N−NFi ) |Bi|+r
F
i
|Bi|+NFi
·k+k ·NFi . In this equation, whenNFi satisfied
NFi 2−rFi ·NFi +N (|Bi|+rFi ) = 0, it is the critical point for seller
i to be bribery-proof. Meaning, no strategy can profit with number of
fair raters larger thanNFi . Such result appeals for incentives that can
attract fair raters give their rating in the system.
6 Conclusion
We formally define the bribing behaviors of sellers in the rating sys-
tem and analyze its effect using game theory. Sellers and their brib-
ing behaviors are mapped into players and the corresponding strategy
space in the game. In the static game, where the sellers and buyers
are static and their payoffs are common knowledge, we found Nash
equilibrium is existed in the system when all sellers perform their
best-bribing strategy. In the equilibrium state, the system is not only
bribery-proof but also has the problem of commons among sellers.
In the dynamic game, we slice the game into a subgame for analy-
sis. In each subgame, Bayesian subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
does exist when all seller selects the strategy that can maximize their
expected payoffs.
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